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ABSTRACT. Michael Psellos exposed his theory on intellect in two major texts: 
De omnifaria doctrina and Philosophica minora. Psellos’ theory is based on different philosophical sources, including, first and foremost, Proclus’ texts. The younger contemporary of Psellos, Georgian philosopher Ioane Petritsi, who was trained in Byzantine philosophical school and was well acquainted with ancient Greek philosophical tradition, also commented on Proclus and his theory of intellect. For Proclus, Psellos and Petritsi intellect is an important entity because it embraces Forms and is, therefore, a basis for all kinds of beings. The aim of this paper is to analyze Psellos’ and Petritsi’s theories of intellect and their interrelationship taking into consideration their dependence on the common philosophical sources, mainly Proclus’ Elements of theology.  
Keywords: intellect, soul, one, participation, being.    
Introduction  Michael Psellos, as a Byzantine erudite, philosopher and specialist of Platonic tradition, had students and followers not only among Greeks or those intellectuals who wrote in Greek but there was at least one Georgian scholar who shared his interest in ancient Greek philosophy. This was Ioane Petritsi who lived either in the eleventh-twelfth centuries and was a student of John Italos, or one generation later, in the twelfth century, being in such a case an indirect follower of Psellos’ philosophical tradition.2 We do not know exactly                                                              1 Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Tbilisi Ivane Javakhishvili 
State University, Georgia. Email: lelaalexidze@hotmail.com. 2 For a summary of different points of view on the period of Petritsi’s life see L. Gigineishvili, 
The Platonic Theology of Ioane Petritsi. (Gorgias Press, Piscataway, NJ, 2007), 12-19, and Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos. Übersetzung aus dem Altgeorgischen, Anmerkungen, Indices und Einleitung von L. Alexidze, L. Bergemann. B. R. Grüner, (Amsterdam/ Philadelphia, 2009), 1-7. 
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when Petritsi lived though we are well aware that he knew Greek fluently and admired especially Greek philosophical language.3 According to Petritsi’s own testimony in his so-called epilogue of the commentary on Proclus’ Elements of 
Theology,4 he lived and worked among Greeks (evidently, in Constantinople) and then among Georgians.  As Petritsi says, he aimed to make adequate translations of philosophical texts from Greek into Georgian and elaborate Georgian philosophical terminology corresponding to Greek original. However, Petritsi claims that neither Greeks nor Georgians appreciated his work. Nevertheless, Petritsi, as he says, did his best, translating Greek philosophical texts as exactly as possible, introducing, as we guess from his translations, some innovative Georgian concepts in order to express adequately the sense of Greek philosophical terminology. He also wished to reflect the meaning of Greek philosophical concepts more adequately than – as he thought – had previously been done by any other Georgian translator.5 Obviously, Petritsi shared Psellos’ interest in ancient Greek philosophy, i.e. first and foremost, in Proclus and along with Proclus, in Platonic tradition generally, including those texts which were acknowledged by Platonists as Platonic philosophy before and after Plato.6 According to later tradition (18th century), Petritsi translated a number of philosophical and theological texts.7 However, nowadays we can only be sure that he translated two texts and wrote an extant commentary on one of them. Other translations either did not survive or we cannot be certain that Petritsi was really their author. The remaining works, without any doubt, translated and commented by Petritsi, are: 1. Nemesios Emesa’s On the Nature of Man,                                                              3 Petritsi frequently uses Greek words and phrases. He respects Greek philosophical language and Greek terminology which is able to express adequately the sense of philosophical ideas. See in Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica, 3-5. 4 For Petritsi’s text I use the following edition: იოანე პეტრიწის შრომები. ტომი II. განმარტებაჲ 
პროკლე დიადოხოსისა და პლატონურისა ფილოსოფიისათჳს. ტექსტი გამოსცეს და 
გამოკვლევა დაურთეს შ. ნუცუბიძემ და ს. ყაუხჩიშვილმა. ტფილისის სახელმწიფო 
უნივერსიტეტის გამომცემლობა, ტფილისი 1937. This edition has also the title in Latin: Ioannis Petrizii Opera. Tomus II: Commentaria in Procli Diadochi ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΝ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗΝ. Textum Hibericum ediderunt commentariisque instruxerunt S. Nutsubidse et S. Kauchtschischvili. Sumptibus Universitatis Tbilisiensis. (Tbilisiis 1937) (in Georgian). Henceforth referred to as “Petritsi, II”+chapter (or: prologue, or: epilogue), page. 5 Petritsi, II, prologue, 6; ch. 50, 107; ch. 140, 171; epilogue, 220 – 223. See also L. Alexidze, “Ioane Petritsi”, - in: Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance. Edited by S. Gersh. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014), 229. 6 See L. Gigineishvili, The Platonic Theology, 5-12. On Petritsi’s ancient Greek philosophical sources see L. Alexidze, “Griechische Philosophie in den Kommentaren des Ioane Petrizi”, - in: Oriens 
Christianus 81 (1997): 148-168. 7 L. Gigineishvili, The Platonic Theology, 20-23. 
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translated by Petritsi and supplied by some short scholia;8 2. Proclus’ Elements 
of Theology, translated by Petritsi;9 3. Petritsi’s commentary on Proclus’ Elements 
of Theology, supplied by Petritsi’s prologue and epilogue. Thus, Petritsi’s original (not translated) work is his commentary on all propositions of Proclus’ 
Elements, together with his prologue and epilogue. As Proclus was the common source of interest and inspiration for both Psellos and Petritsi,10 it is interesting to know whether Petritsi’s interpretation of philosophical issues depends on Psellos’ works or directly on Proclus. The aim of this paper is to answer this question by analyzing one particular aspect of Neoplatonic philosophy: theory of intellect. We shall try to find out, whether Petritsi’s understanding of intellect is a direct commentary on Proclus’ treatise or his interpretation was mediated by Psellos’ works on the same issue.11 For this purpose, we analyze Psellos’ texts concerning intellect from De omnifaria doctrina12 and take into consideration also certain fragments from the small philosophical treatises (Philosophica                                                              8 ნემესიოს ემესელი, ბუნებისათჳს კაცისა. ბერძნულიდან გადმოღებული იოვანე პეტრიწის 
მიერ. ქართული ტექსტი შეისწავლა, გამოსაცემად დაამზადა და ლექსიკონ-საძიებლები 
დაურთო ს. რ. გორგაძემ. გამოცემა საეკლესიო მუზეუმისა 17. ტფილისი 1914 [Nemesios of Emesa, On the Nature of Man. Translated from Greek into Georgian by Ioane Petritsi. Edited with indices by S. R. Gorgadze. Published by Ecclesiastical Museum. Tbilisi 1914 (in Georgian)]. Henceforth referred to as Nemesios, On the Nature of Man, geo+page. 9 იოანე პეტრიწის შრომები, ტომი I. პროკლე დიადოხოსისა პლატონურისა ფილოსოფოსისა 
კავშირნი. ქართული ტექსტი გამოსცა და გამოკვლევა და ლექსიკონი დაურთო სიმ. 
ყაუხჩიშვილმა. შესავალი სტატია მ. გოგიბერიძისა. თსუ გამომცემლობა, თბილისი 1940. The book has the title also in Latin: Ioannis Petritzii Opera. Tomus I: Proclis Diadochi ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ. Versio Hiberica. Textum Hibericum edidit commentariisque instruxit S. Kauchtschischvili. (Tbilisiis 1940) (in Georgian). Henceforth referred to as: Petritsi, I, prop.+page. 10 On Proclus’ works in Psellos see D. J. O’Meara, “Michael Psellos”, - in: Interpreting Proclus, 165-181; F. Lauritzen, “The Renaissance of Proclus in Eleventh Century”, - in: Proclus and his Legacy. Edited by D. Butorac, D. Layne. (De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2016), 233-239; F. Lauritzen, “A Lifetime with Proclus: Psellos as reader”, - in: Byzantinische Zeitschrift, Bd. 113/1, 2020: 1. Abteilung. (De Gruyter, 2020), 69-80; F. Lauritzen, “An Orthodox and Byzantine Reception of the Elements of Theology”, - in: Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 2. Translations and Acculturations. Edited by D. Calma. (Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2021), 19-31; J. Robinson, “’A Mixing Cup of Piety and Learnedness’: Michael Psellos and Nicholas of Methone as Readers of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, - in: Reading 
Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 2, 56-93. On Proclus’ works as sources of Petritsi’s commentary see the bibliography in Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica, 411-418. 11 On Petritsi’s theory of intellect see T. Iremadze, Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur 
Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter. Dietrich von 
Freiberg – Berthold von Moosburg – Joane Petrizi. B. R. Grüner, (Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 2004), 220-241, and L. Gigineishvili, The Platonic Theology, 145-175. 12 Michael Psellos, De omnifaria Doctrina. Critical text and introduction by L. G. Westerink. J. L. Beijers N.V., (Utrect, 1948).  
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minora II),13 which concern intellect. For Petritsi, we shall concentrate on some fragments from his commentary on Proclus’ Elements. We also pay attention to the relationship between Psellos’ Omnifaria doctrina and Philosophica minora, Proclus’ Elements of Theology,14 and Petritsi’s commentary. We shall start with De Omnifaria doctrina and analyze chapters 21-30 which directly concern intellect. We shall briefly expose Psellos’ text chapter after chapter comparing them with corresponding propositions from Proclus’ 
Elements of Theology, and see whether Petritsi’s interpretation of the same ideas is different or not. Thus, we shall try to find out how much the texts of Proclus, Psellos and Petritsi correspond to each other. Generally, the characteristic of intellect is quite an eclectic one in Psellos, it is a mixture of definitions from Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Porphyry, Nemesios, and Proclus, that’s why it is difficult to resume his own point of view.    
1. Chapters on intellect from Psellos’ De omnifaria doctrina compared 
with Petritsi’s commentaries on Proclus’ Elements 
 In De omnifaria doctrina, chapters 21-30, which are mostly based on Proclus’ Elements of theology, Psellos defines intellect as immortal, indivisible, and incorporeal substance. He analyzes intellect’s types, claims that the first unparticipated intellect is superior to any being, and calls it ‘demiurge of everything’. Psellos also discusses the relationship between intellect and soul; he characterizes intellect’s mode of thinking demonstrating its difference from soul’s method of cognition. Further Psellos speaks about the relationship between substance, activity, and potency in intellect comparing it with that which characterizes soul. Now we shall discuss more in detail, chapter after chapter, Psellos’ point of view on intellect, comparing it with Proclus’ Elements, and Petritsi’s commentaries on Proclus’ propositions.15 
Chapter 21 In this chapter, Psellos claims that not all intellects are participated  by all souls. The first intellect transcends all beings, and it is the demiurge of                                                              13 Michael Psellus, Philosophica minora, vol. II. Edidit D. J. O’Meara. (B. G. Teubner Verlagsgesellshaft, Leipzig, 1989).  14 Proclus, The Elements of Theology. A revised text with translation, introduction and commentary by E. R. Dodds. 2nd ed. (At the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963).  15 In Westerink’s edition of De omnifaria doctrina the editor indicated in notes Psellos’ possible sources, among them numbers of propositions from Proclus’ Elements of theology. This is a great help for me and anyone in the process of working on these issues. 
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everything, that is why it cannot be participated by any soul.16 Thus, it is the unparticipated intellect. It is followed by the participated intellect, though the latter is not the cosmic intellect but the hypercosmic one, followed on its own turn, by the cosmic intellect. As Psellos says, according to Greek theories, the cosmos is ensouled and provided by intellect.17 Correspondingly, the cosmic soul participates in the hypercosmic intellect not immediately but by means of the cosmic intellect. Then Psellos sums up the hierarchy of intellects and souls as follows: the unparticipated intellect, the participated one, the cosmic one, the hypercosmic soul, and the cosmic one.18 Comparing Psellos’ theory with Petritsi’s model of the hierarchy of various kinds of intellects and souls, we can see a slight difference. According to Petritsi, first (1) is the unparticipated intellect and it is the true Being.19 As for Psellos, as far as I see, he does not call the first, unparticipated intellect ‘the true Being’; correspondingly, he says that the first intellect transcends all beings.20 After the unparticipated intellect, according to Petritsi, (2) there is the participated one that is twofold: (a) the intellect participated by the universal soul which is incorporeal; (b) the intellect participated by embodied souls.21 In the last fragment a little difference from Psellos’ text is again evident: while Psellos mentions the cosmic soul, Petritsi speaks of any kind of embodied souls, meaning among                                                              16 Psellos puts it in a form of a question: ὁ γὰρ ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα νοῦς καὶ πάντων δημιουργὸς πῶς ἂν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς μετασχεθείη τινός; Psell. omn. 21, 26, 2-3 Westerink. 17 ἐπεὶ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων λόγους καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κόσμος ἔμψυχος ἅμα καὶ ἕννους ἐστι. Psell. omn. 21, 26, 8-10 Westerink. 18 Psell. omn. 21, 26, 1-13 Westerink. Corresponds to Procl. ET, prop. 166, 144.9-21 Dodds. Westerink pointed to the similarity of Psellos’ text to prop. 166 of Proclus’ Elements. (Psellos, Omn., 26 Westerink). However, this chapter of Psellos’ Omnifaria is not as similar to fragments from Proclus’ 
Elements as some other chapters of Psellos’ same treatise. 19 Petritsi, II, ch. 166, 185, 1-2: “ესე ხედვაჲ ესთა მეტყჳს ჩუენ, ვითარმედ სამ სახედ გაიყოფვის 
გონება: უზიარებელად, ვითარ იგი არს ნამდჳლ მყოფი, რამეთუ უზიარებელ არს ვითარ 
პირველი გონებაჲ და პირველი მყოფი.” (“This thesis tells us that intellect is divided in three kinds: unparticipated one, such as the true Being, because it is unparticipated as the first intellect and the first being”). On the true Being as the first intellect in Petritsi see L. Alexidze, The Demiurge in Ioane Petritsi’s Commentary on Proclus’ Elements of Theology, - in: Revista Latinoamericana de 
Filosofía. Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas. (Buenos Aires. Argentina. Vol. 47, N1. Otoño 2021), 149-165. See also ლ. ალექსიძე, “მიქაელ ფსელოსი, მრავალფეროვანი მეცნიერება: ფრაგმენტები 
გონების შესახებ. ბერძნულიდან თარგმანი, შენიშვნები და ბოლოსიტყვა. რელიგია, 1-2-3, 
თბილისი, 2004, გვ. 33 [L. Alexidze, “Michael Psellos, De omnifaria doctrina: Die Fragmente über den Geist. Georgische Übersetzung mit Anmerkungen und Nachwort”, - in: Religia, 1-2-3, (Tbilisi, 2004), 33 (in Georgian, title and summary in German)]. 20 ὁ γὰρ ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα νοῦς. (Psell. omn. 21, 26, 2 Westerink). 21 Petritsi, II, ch. 166, 185, 1-6. Petritsi mentions the threefold classification of the intellects again in chapter 184. As he says, intellect can be either divine, or just a pure intellect, or an intellectual being. Petritsi, II, ch. 184, 193, 24-26. 
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them, as we can suppose, the whole cosmic soul, too. Petritsi mentions the threefold classification of intellects again in chapter 184. As he says, intellect can be either divine, or a pure intellect, or an intellectual being.22 We know that the true Being is the divine intellect for Petritsi. The problem for the reader of Petritsi’s commentary is what kind of intellect the demiurge is. In what follows, we shall try to answer this question. Now, as we have seen a difference between Psellos’ and Petritsi’s interpretations of the first intellect regarding the question whether the first unparticipated intellect is being or not, we can make a conclusion, whether Petritsi with his definition of the first unparticipated intellect followed directly Proclus or rather Psellos’ opinion. The answer is in favour of direct dependence on Proclus, because, according to Proclus, the true Being “is a divine Intelligible, and unparticipated”.23 Moreover, “it fills by itself the Intellect, and the Intellect too is a being, as far as it is filled with the being.”24 As for Petritsi, he claims that the true Being precedes all other subsequent intellects.25 Unlike Proclus and Petritsi, Psellos places the realm of being not above intellect or in intellect, but after it. As he claims, while the first intellect is “above all beings and is the demiurge of everything, how can it be participated by any soul?”26 Thus, Psellos identifies the first unparticipated intellect with the demiurge of everything.27 This can mean that in Psellos’ interpretation ‘the demiurge’ has a function of the supreme God – the creator of all, and that it/he transcends any kind of being. Therefore, we can conclude that commenting on prop. 161 and 166 of Proclus’ Elements and generally, on his theory of intellect-being relationship, Petritsi follows directly Proclus and not Psellos’ interpretation. Both in Proclus and Petritsi, Being precedes intellect and ‘fills’ it with itself, being an object of intellection for the intellect,28 while in Psellos it is the first unparticipated intellect that is prior to any being. Nevertheless, the relationship between Psellos’ and Petritsi’s interpretations is not as easy as it seems from the first sight, because both of them share one common tendency: Petritsi too identifies (though not always and not very clearly) the demiurge with the supreme One or with the creator of everything, including the incorporeal world, thus, elevating                                                              22 Petritsi, II, ch. 184, 193. 23 Procl. ET 161, 140, 14-15 Dodds. Transl. by Dodds, 141. In some cases, using Dodds’ translation of Proclus’ Elements, I make a slight modification, mainly for one reason: for Greek νοῦς I use consequently ‘intellect’, and for οὐσία ‘substance’.  24 Procl. ET 161, 140, 17-18. Transl. by Dodds, 141, slightly modified. 25 Petritsi, II, ch. 161, 182, 1-2. 26 Psell. omn. 21, 26, 3-4 Westerink, quoted above in Greek. 27 On Plato’s theory of demiurge and ideas see Psell. Phil. Min. 2.33, 34, 111-117 O’Meara. We shall not analyze these texts in this paper. 28 See also Petritsi’s translation of prop. 161 and 166 in Petritsi, I, 96-97 and 99-100. 
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him, like Psellos, above the realm of beings. The demiurge in Petritsi’s commentary is a craftsman, god, who forms the visible world, although in some cases he is almost (i.e. quite vaguely and not clearly) identified with the supreme One.29 Or, to put it more precisely, it is the supreme One which becomes in rare cases the features of a personal god and demiurge. However, on the other hand, in the ontological hierarchy exposed by Petritsi, the true Being (i.e. the first being, the father of intellects, the totality of intellects) plays a crucial role as the prime principle of all kinds of beings and forms, i.e. of everything except formless matter. Obviously, the true Being is much more important to Petritsi than the demiurge, as he mentions the former regularly. The true Being is for Petritsi the ‘paradeigma’ of Plato’s Timaeus, i.e. it is the supreme intelligible intellect, while the demiurge, as we guess, plays a role of an intellectual intellect. Thus, in Petritsi’s commentary, on the one hand, the features of the supreme One and the demiurge as producers of the whole universe are in certain cases virtually identical,30 though on the other hand, the demiurge represents a lower level of intellect than the true Being and in many cases, he is absent where a reader of Petritsi’s commentary, following the context, expects his presence. Anyway, whatever might be the role and character of Plato’s demiurge in Petritsi’s philosophy, it cannot be compared with the immense importance and much more definite characteristic that the true Being (i.e. the paradigm of cosmos in Timaeus) has in Petritsi’s ontological system.  As an illustration of Petritsi’s point of view on the true Being and intellect, we point to certain passages from his commentary on Proclus’ Elements. The true Being is, according to Petritsi, the summit of intellects. As Petritsi says, the first intellect, which is the first cosmos and the first composed thing, is the true Being. It is a kind of a monad of all intellects and all those entities which possess form and figure. Each realm of intellects is a part of this first intellect.                                                              29 See L. Alexidze, “The Supreme One: Its Transcendence and Its ‘Kataphatic’ Characteristics in Ioane Petritsi’s Philosophy”, - in: Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter. Band 20, 2017. Herausgegeben von M. Baumbach, O. Pluta. (John Benjamins Publishing Company. Amsterdam / Philadelphia), 83-84. 30 In the so-called epilogue Petritsi says that God the begetter made harmony and order on all levels of begotten beings through the mediation of the primordial images which he holds in his intellect, and brought the forms down to matter, searching for production of diversity from one and the same (i.e. not differentiated) matter. (Petritsi, II, epilogue, 217). In this fragment Petritsi speaks about the supreme One – the principle of everything, God - and his characteristics are similar to that of the demiurge. As for the true Being, we can suppose that the totality of ‘primordial images’ can be identified with it. Thus, these images, in a way, are God’s thoughts. Here we have a quite Christianized version of (neo)platonic theory of creation of the universe which is typical of Petritsi’s so-called epilogue, where he tries to demonstrate the compatibility of (neo)platonic One with Christian Trinity, though atypical of his prologue and commentary. (L. Alexidze, “Ioane Petritsi”, - in: Interpreting Proclus, 235) 
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The first intellect is like a god and seer of everything that it has produced. The first pure intellect is the image of the One and, at the same time, is the monad of intellects. As an entity which contains parts, the first intellect is not one, though as the monad of intellects it is one and the image of the One.31 Petritsi characterizes the first true Being as the universal intellect, and says that it is produced by the divine henads, and “the great Greek theologians called it the ‘sky of the intellects’ and ‘intelligible altar’”.32 Again, the true Being is called by Petritsi “the sky of intellects and souls”.33 Moreover, Petritsi claims that the true Being is the principle of everything (here, taking into consideration other parts of Petritsi’s commentary, we can add that by ‘everything’ he does not mean prime matter, but everything that has form),34 including the physical cosmos – ‘sky’.35 Thus, Petritsi characterizes the true Being as the principle of all intellects, as an unparticipated intellect and the ‘sky of intellects’. He claims that the true Being is produced by henads and is divine. All other intermediate intellects produced by the true Being are also called ‘intellects’ up to the intellectual intellect. Therefore, according to Petritsi, the intelligible intellect is the true Being, and all other subsequent intellects are intellectuals. The last ones are filled with the light of the true Being.36 In some cases, Petritsi even claims that the true Being is superior to intellect.37 He probably means that it is superior to other kinds of intellects, not the first, i.e. unparticipated one. Hence, in chapter 101 Petritsi distinguishes the first Being from intellect. As he says, the first Being is the true Being, it is the image of the supreme One, thereafter comes life and then intellect.38  
Chapter 22 In this chapter, Psellos discusses the activity of intellect i.e. the act of intellection. The chapter repeats almost exactly but fragmentarly prop. 167 of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. In chapter 22 of De omnifaria doctrina Psellos claims that every intellect thinks itself. However, the first and unparticipated intellect thinks only itself, because there is nothing before it that it could think, nor does it think anything that which is consequent upon it because it possesses                                                              31 Petritsi, II, ch. 2, 21.  32 და ცად გონებათად და გონებითად საკურთხეველადცა უწოდეს დიდთა და 
ღმრთისმეტყუელთა ბრძენთა. Petritsi II, ch. 130, 166, 22-23. The true Being is called by Petritsi “the sky of the intellects” also in chapter 24, Petritsi, II, ch. 24, 67, 23-24. 33 დადვეს იგი ვითარმედ ცად გონებათა და სულთად. Petritsi, II, ch. 136, 169, 20.  34 Petritsi, II, ch. 11, 42-43. 35 Petritsi, II, ch. 140, 171, 17. 36 Petritsi, II, ch. 181, 192.  37 Petritsi, II, ch. 128, 165, 1. 38 Petritsi, II, ch. 101, 148, 1-14. 
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the knowledge of the lower entities as a kind of a non-intellection that is better than intellection. Thus, in such a case, this kind of intellect is simultaneously intellect and the intelligible: it is intellect because it thinks itself, and it is the intelligible because it is thought by itself.39 Further, Psellos explains that the participated intellect, which follows the unparticipated intellect, knows itself and at the same time it knows the prior intellect.40 As Psellos claims, every intellect knows either itself or that which is above or that which is consequent upon it.41 If it knows that which is consequent upon it, it will turn down toward the inferior;42 if it knows that which is above it, then, if it knows it through knowing itself, it will have simultaneous knowledge of itself and that what is superior; if it knows only the higher, then it will be an intellect ignorant of itself;43 but if it knows its prior, it will know itself also.44 Then Psellos sums up:                                                               39 Πᾶς νοῦς ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ. ἀλλ’ὁ μὲν πρῶτος νοῦς καὶ ἀμέθεκτος ἑαυτὸν μόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχει τὶ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἵνα ἐκεῖνο νοήσῃ, τὰ δὲ μετ’αὐτὸν οὐκ ἂν νοήσειεν, ἀλλ’ἔχει τούτων τὴν νόησιν ἀνοησίᾳ κρείττονι νοήσεως. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς νοῦς ἅμα καὶ νοητόν· νοῦς μὲν ὡς νοῶν ἑαυτόν, νοητὸν δὲ ὡς νοούμενον ὑφ’ἑαυτοῦ. Psell. omn. 22, 26, 1-6 Westerink. The first phrase exactly repeats the very beginning of Proclus’ prop. 167: Πᾶς νοῦς ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ, (Procl. ET 167, 144, 22 Dodds). The second phrase of Psellos’ text corresponds almost exactly to Proclus’ same proposition: ἀλλ’ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἑαυτὸν μόνον. Procl. ET 167, 144, 22-23 Dodds. The phrase ἀνοησίᾳ κρείττονι νοήσεως in Psell. omn. 22, 26, 4 is the same as in Porph. sent. 25, 15, 2 Lamberz (see note by Westerink in Psellos, Omn., 26). 40 ὁ δὲ μετὰ τὸν ἀμέθεκτον μεθεκτός νοῦς ἑαυτόν τε ἅμα νοεῖ καὶ τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ νοῦν. Psell. omn. 22, 26, 6 – 27, 1 Westerink. This phrase repeats almost exactly Proclus’ thesis from the Elements of 
Theology, prop. 167, 144, 23-24 Dodds: ἕκαστος δὲ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ἑαυτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. (“whereas each subsequent intellect [i.e. each intellect which follows the primal intellect – L.A.] knows simultaneously itself and its priors”, transl. by Dodds, 145, modified). 41 πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς ἢ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ ἢ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτὸν ἢ τὸ μεθ’ἑαυτόν. Psell. omn. 22, 27, 2. It is almost the same as in Proclus: ἢ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ πᾶς νοῦς ἢ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτὸν ἢ τὸ μεθ’ἑαυτόν. (Procl. ET 167, 144, 26-27 Dodds). “For any intellect must know either itself or that which is above it or that which is consequent upon it”, transl. by Dodds (p. 145), slightly modified. 42 ἀλλ’εἰ μὲν τὸ μεθ’ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ, κατὰ τὸ χεῖρον ἐπιστρέφει. Psell. omn. 22, 27, 8-9 Westerink. Again, Psellos repeats almost exactly Proclus’ thesis from prop. 167: ἀλλ’εἰ μὲν τὸ μεθ’ἑαυτὸν, πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἐπιστρέφει. (Procl. ET 167, 144, 28 Dodds). 43 εἰ δὲ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ, εἰ μὲν διὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γνώσεως, ἑαυτὸν ἅμα κἀκεῖνο γνώσεται· εἰ δὲ ἑκεῖνο μόνον, ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοήσει νοῦς ὤν. (Psell. omn. 22, 27, 9-11 Westerink). After having quoted from Elements (prop. 167, 144, 28 Dodds), Psellos omitted some passages from Proclus’ text (the fragment which is not reproduced in Psellos’ treatese corresponds to Procl. ET 167, 144, 28-32 Dodds) and then repeated almost exactly, as we can see, the following text by Proclus: εἰ δὲ τὸ ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν, εἰ μὲν διὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γνώσεως, ἑαυτὸν ἅμα κἀκεῖνο γνώσεται· εἰ δὲ ἑκεῖνο μόνον, ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοήσει νοῦς ὤν. (Procl. ET 167, 146, 1-3 Dodds). 44 ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ γινώσκων γνώσεται καὶ ἑαυτόν. Psell. omn. 22, 27, 11-12 Westerink. Here Psellos skipped over Procl. ET 167, 146, 3-7 Dodds, and repeated almost exactly the following passage from the same proposition of Proclus’ Elements: πάντως ἄρα τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γινώσκων γνώσεται καὶ ἑαυτόν. (Procl. ET 167, 146, 7-8 Dodds). 
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“There is thus an intelligible in the intellect and an intellect in the intelligible, and one is more universal and another is more partial.”45 Thus, in chapter 22 of De omnifaria doctrina Psellos repeats almost exactly some fragments from prop. 167 of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. As for Petritsi, the accents he makes in his commentary on the same proposition, seem to be slightly different from those of Psellos. Petritsi analyzes the kinds of intellect in the context of ousia-dynamis-energeia dialectic. He claims that every intellect acts in a threefold manner: (1) it can be equal to itself, i.e. it is a pure intellect, because its activity is identical with its substance; (2) it knows also that which is consequent upon it, and has, therefore, an activity which is weaker than its own substance; and, (3) “it thinks its own causes, and it possesses the intellection that is better than itself, because it becomes a member of its own noetoi46, i.e. of the intelligibles, and thinks, therefore, also its own self better, and it is the intellect and the intelligible, because all intelligibles are better than intellectual[s]”.47 Further, Petritsi explains again that every intelligible is better than the intellectual, and knowledge of principles and causes is, at the same time, a better knowledge of self and of that which is consequent upon it. Thus, knowledge of causes is a better knowledge of self. Hence, knowledge is twofold: (a) knowledge of the cause as of that which is better than self, and (b) knowledge of self in the cause (i.e. by means of the knowledge of the cause) as its producer.48 Generally, Petritsi frequently discusses the activity of intellects. As he claims, all intellects act in a twofold manner: on the one hand, they see those entities which precede                                                              45 ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ἐν τῷ νῷ νοητὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ νοῦς, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὁλικώτερος, ὁ δὲ μερικώτερος. (Psell. omn. 22, 27, 12-13 Westerink). After the last quotation from Procl. ET 167, 7-8 Dodds, Psellos omitted few lines (p. 146, 9-11 Dodds), and then repeated exactly the following thesis from Proclus: ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ἐν τῷ νῷ νοητὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ νοῦς (Procl. ET 167, 146, 11-12 Dodds). As for the last additional text in Psellos (καὶ ὁ μὲν ὁλικώτερος, ὁ δὲ μερικώτερος, Psell. omn. 22, 27, 13 Westerink), it is a brief resumé of Procl. ET 167, 146, 9-11, and 12-15 Dodds: “If, then, there is an intelligible Intellect, in knowing itself, being intelligible, it knows the intelligible which is its own being; whilst each subsequent intellect knows simultaneously the intelligible which is its own content and the prior intelligible. […] but the higher Intellect is identical with its object, whereas the lower is identical with its own content but not with the prior Intelligible – for the unconditioned Intelligible (τὸ ἁπλῶς νοητὸν) is distinct from the intelligible in the knower.” Transl. By Dodds, 147, slightly modified. Psellos, apparently, means with ὁ μὲν ὁλικώτερος the intelligible intellect, and with ὁ δὲ μερικώτερος the intelligible in that intellect which is intellectual/knower. This distinction of ὁ μὲν ὁλικώτερος, ὁ δὲ μερικώτερος can correspond also to the previous divison of kinds of intellect, descibed by Psellos in the same chapter: an unparticipated intellect and participated one. 46 Petritsi uses here the Greek word in Georgian transliteration. Petritsi, II, ch. 167, 185, 22. 47 Petritsi, II, ch. 167, 185, 20-24. 48 Petritsi, II, ch. 167, 185, 24-31. 
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them and, on the other, take care (i.e. exercise their providential activity) on those that are inferior.49  To my mind, both Psellos and Petritsi follow Proclus, though the accents are slightly different, and obviously Petritsi’s commentary on prop. 167 is not based on chapter 22 of Psellos’ De omnifaria doctrina.  
Chapter 23 In this chapter Psellos analyzes substance, activity and potency of intellect: they are eternal.50 The substance of intellect is a simultaneous whole,51 it does not grow up or change in time.52 The intellection of intellect is similar to its substance, it is absolutely complete and whole. Intellect thinks everything at once, its mode of thinking is neither in past, nor in future, but in the eternal present. Intellect does not change or move, nor does it require premises and conclusions, unlike soul, because it knows everything at once.53 Further, Psellos characterizes intellect making a paraphrase from the last part of Proclus’ prop. 169 and concludes that intellect is unmoved so that it cannot be measured by time in respect either of its substance or its activity. And if its substance and activity are both eternal, then also potency which is between them, has an eternal existence.54 Interestingly, in prop. 169 Proclus does not discuss the differences between intellect’s and soul’s mode of cognition. For Petritsi, the difference between intellect’s and soul’s mode of cognition is a major issue of Proclus’ philosophy, though in                                                              49 Petritsi, II, ch. 135, 169, 3-7. 50 πᾶς νοῦς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αἰώνια ἔχει. Psell. omn. 23, 27, 2-3 Westerink. This is an almost exact quotation from Proclus: πᾶς νοῦς ἐν αἰῶνι τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. (Procl. ET 169, 146, 24-25 Dodds) “Every intellect has its substance, potency and activity in eternity”, transl. by Dodds, 147, modified. 51 ὅλη γὰρ ἅμα ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία τοῦ νοῦ. Psell. omn. 23, 27, 3 Westerink. Psellos paraphrases here the passage from the middle part of Proclus’ prop. 169: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ νοῦ αἰώνιος, <δῆλον>· ὅλη γὰρ ἅμα ἐστί. (Procl. ET 169, 146, 29-30 Dodds) “Now it is plain that the substance of intellect is eternal, since it is a simultanious whole.” Transl. by Dodds, 147, modified. Cf. Πᾶν τὸ αἰώνιον ὅλον ἅμα ἐστίν. (Procl. ET 52, 50, 7) “All that is eternal is a simultaneous whole”, transl. by Dodds, 51. 52 Psell. omn. 23, 27, 3-4 Westerink. 53 Psell. omn. 23, 27, 4-9 Westerink. Cf. Porph. sent. 44, 57-59 Lamberz; Petritsi, II, prologue, 6-9. See also L. Alexidze, “Dianoia in Ioane Petritsi’s commentary on Proclus’ Elements of Theology”, - in: 
Chôra. Revue d’études anciennes et médiévales. Philosophie, théologie, sciences. 14/2016, (Polirom 2016), 177-194. 54 ἀκίνητος γὰρ ὢν οὐκ ἂν ὑπὸ χρόνου μετροῖτο, οὔτε κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. εἰ οῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τούτου αἰώνιος καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ μέση τούτων οῦσα δύναμις αἰωνίαν τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐκληρώσατο. (Psell. omn. 23, 27, 9-12 Westerink). Cf. εἰ γὰρ ἀκίνητος ὁ νοῦς, οὐκ ἂν ὑπὸ χρόνου μετροῖτο οὔτε κατὰ τὸ εἶναι οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τούτων δὲ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων, καὶ ἡ δύναμις αἰώνιος. (Procl. ET 169, 148, 1-3 Dodds) “for if intellect is unmoved, it cannot be measured by time in respect either of its being or of its activity. And if the substance and the activity of intellect are invariable, so likewise is its potency”. Transl. by Dodds, 149, slightly modified. 
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the commentary on prop. 169 he discusses this theme quite briefly, unlike other parts of his work, as, for example, in chapter 170 of the commentary, in which he again analyzes this issue.55 In the commentary on prop. 169 Petritsi concentrates mainly on the art of intellect’s thinking. Like Proclus and Psellos, he claims that intellect’s substance, potency, and activity are fixed in an unmoved condition in eternity, since everything that is as a whole in eternity, is unmoved. Neither intellect’s potency nor its activity grows up or becomes less, but is stable in its identity. Intellect acts toward itself and looks toward itself because it possesses the object of intellection in itself. Thus, thinking its own self, intellect thinks everything, and that is the object of its intellection – the intelligible. Therefore, in case of intellect the intelligible and the intellectual, i.e. the knower are the same: the intelligible is the intellectual and, vice versa, the intellectual is the intelligible, while the activity of intellect is intermediate between them.56 In the last part of the commentary on prop. 169, Petritsi briefly characterizes the mode of soul’s thinking too. As he claims, when Proclus mentions three aspects of intellection: the intellectual, the intelligible, and intellect57 between them, we should mean the mode of soul’s thinking, which is three partial, while intellect is simultaneously the intellectual and the intelligible, and it does not multiply, unlike soul’s mode of cognition, which consists of three parts.58 Petritsi’s commentary on prop. 169 of Proclus’ Elements of theology does not contradict to Psellos’ interpretation of the same proposition as it is exposed in chapter 23 of De omnifaria doctrina, though the accents in these two interpretations are different. In this case, too, Petritsi’s commentary could be directly influenced by Proclus’ works. 
Chapter 24 This chapter is, as Westerink’s notes testify, a combination of paraphrases from Proclus’ Elements of theology, prop. 171 and 172.59 According to Psellos, every intellect is an indivisible substance. It has no magnitude, is not a body, does not move at all and is therefore indivisible. For whatever is divisible is divided either as a manifold or as a magnitude.60                                                               55 Petritsi, II, ch. 170, 187, 4-10, 13-15. 56 Petritsi, II, ch. 169, 186, 13-24. 57 I suppose, Petritsi means here rather the act of intellection. Sometimes ‘intellect’ (გონებაჲ, corresponds to νοῦς) and ‘act of intellection’ (გაგონებაჲ, corresponds to νοεῖν) are used synonymously by Petritsi. 58 Petritsi, II, ch. 169, 186, 25-30. 59 Westerink in Psellos, Omn., 27. 60 Πᾶς νοῦς οὐσία ἐστὶν ἀμέριστος. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχον μέγεθος, τὸ μὴ ὄν σῶμα, τὸ μὴ κινούμενον πάντως καὶ ἀμέριστον· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μέριζομενον ἢ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος μερίζεται ἢ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος. (Psell. omn. 
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Proclus’ and Psellus’ theses correspond to Petritsi’s commentary on the same proposition 171 of Proclus’ Elements:  “That what is absolutely without magnitude and movement, is indivisible, because everything divisible is such as a manifold, like number, or as a magnitude”.61 Further, Psellos explains, why intellect is indivisible and incorporeal. He paraphrases the next part of Proclus’ Elements, prop. 171. As Psellos claims, if intellect is in all respects eternal and if it transcends bodies, then it is certainly indivisible. But why is intellect incorporeal? Because it thinks itself62 and reverts upon itself, while the body does not think itself.63 But what makes it evident that intellect is eternal? Psellos asserts that intellect’s mode of thinking is not divisible, but it remains in the sameness, like its substance.64  This part of Psellos’ text corresponds to chapters 169 and 170 of Petritsi’s commentary on Proclus’ Elements of theology.65 Then Psellos analyzes the constitutive power of intellect. This part of chapter 24 seems to be more ‘independent’ from Proclus’ text than the chapters we discussed above. Psellos asserts that not                                                              24, 27, 2-4 Westerink). This is a paraphrase of the first part of prop. 171: Πᾶς νοῦς ἀμέριστός ἐστιν οὐσία. εἰ γὰρ ἀμεγέθης καὶ ἀσώματος καὶ ἀκίνητος, ἀμέριστός ἐστιν. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μεριστὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ μεριστὸν ἑν χρόνῳ φερομένας. (Procl. ET 171, 150, 1-4 Dodds). “every intellect is an indivisible substance. For if it be without magnitude, body or movement, it is indivisible. For whatever is in any sense divisible is so either as a manifold or as a magnitude or else in respect of the temporal course of its activities”. Transl. by Dodds, 151, slightly modified. 61 ხოლო ყოვლითურთ უდიდოჲ და მიუდრეკელი განუწვალებელ. რამეთუ ყოველი 
განწვალებადი ანუ სიმრავლითა არს ვითარ რიცხჳ, ანუ სიდიდითა. Petritsi, II, 187, 25-27, ch. 171. 62 Cf. Πᾶς νοῦς ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ (Procl. ET 167, 144, 22), repeated by Psellos in Omn., ch. 22, 26, 2 Westerink (quoted above). 63 Cf. Procl. ET 169, 146, 26; prop. 186, 162, 17 Dodds, and Petritsi: “But what is the reversion upon itself? It means knowledge of one’s own substance and self.” (ხოლო თუ რაჲ არს უკუნქცევაჲ 
თჳსდადვე? ესე იგი არს ცნობაჲ თჳთ თჳსისა არსებისა და თჳთებისაჲ). Petritsi II, ch. 186, 194, 21-22. Cf. Procl. in Tim. 2.286, 287 Diehl. 64 εἰ δὲ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ πάντα αἰώνιος καὶ ἐπέκεινα σωμάτων, ἀμέριστος ἄρα ἐστί. πόθεν δέ, ὅτι ἀσώματος ὁ νοῦς; ὅτι ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφει, σῶμα γὰρ ἑαυτὸ οὐδὲν νοεῖ. πόθεν δὲ δῆλον, ὅτι αἰώνιος; ὅτι οὐ μερίζεται ἡ νόησις αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ἐν ταυτότητι ἐστὶ διηνεκεῖ, ὥσπερ ἡ οὐσία. (Psell. omn. 24, 27, 4-8 Westerink). This fragment corresponds to Procl. ET 171, 150, 5-9 Dodds: ὁ δὲ νοῦς κατὰ πάντα αἰώνιος, καὶ ἐπέκεινα σωμάτων, καὶ ἥνωται τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ πλῆθος. ἀμέριστος ἄρα ἐστίν. ὅτι δὲ ἀσώματος ὁ νοῦς, ἡ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστροφὴ δηλοῖ· τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων οὐδὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφεται. ὅτι δὲ αἰώνιος, ἡ τῆς ἐνεργείας πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν ταυτότης. (“but intellect is in all respects eternal, it transcends bodies, and its manifold content is unified: therefore intellect is indivisible. That intellect is incorporeal is shown by its reversion upon itself; for bodies are incapable of such reversion. That it is eternal is shown by the identity of its activity with its substance.” Transl. by Dodds, 151, slightly modified). 65 Petritsi, II, ch. 169-170, 186-187. 
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every intellect is constitutive (ὑποστάτης) of everything but only the unparticipated and demiurgic one.66 It produces directly eternal and unchangeable beings, and then those that are changeable and exist in time.67 But it is not so, as Psellos explains, that it produces primarily the first ones and thereafter the others, but it does everything at once68. As for produced beings, they come forth according to their own order and character: some of them according to the intellectual character, some according to the psychical intermediate position, while others according to the physical movement.69 Thus, Psellos’ chapter 24 of De omnifaria doctrina is mainly based on Proclus’ Elements of theology, prop. 171 and 172, including also a passage which might be Psellos’ own text, independent from Proclus’ Elements. As for Petritsi, chapters 169-171 of his commentary correspond to Psellos’ theses concerning the reversion of intellect upon itself, the identity of intellect’s substance, potency, and activity, and their eternal character. As for chapter 172 of Petritsi’s commentary on Proclus’ Elements, here Petritsi claims that intellect, being unmoved and eternal in respect of its substance and activity, produces those beings which are unperishable and immortal in respect of their substances, while moved causes produce that which is moved.70 
Chapter 25 As Psellos claims, the participated intellect which follows the unparticipated one contains intellectually the prior (i.e. the unparticipated) intellect and also possesses the intellectual image of all its consequents. Thus, it possesses the priors and the consequents according to the measure of its own substance. Therefore, it thinks the unparticipated intellect intellectually,71 and it knows soul and physical forms also intellectually. Hence, it does not think the objects of its thought as they are by themselves, but it knows both the superiors and inferiors intellectually. Therefore, it does not change together with the objects                                                              66 I cannot say, whether Psellos sees a difference between paternal and demiurgic (i.e. formal) cause as Proclus does in prop. 157, where he defines the function of the paternal cause as that to bestow being as existence, while the function of the demiurgic cause is to create forms. It is possible that Psellos identified in some cases the demiurgic cause even with the supreme principle of everything, like as Petritsi did it, though quite vaguely and not very explicitly. And is the ‘unparticipated intellect’ the ‘demiurgic’ one? 67 Thus, this intellect produces not only incorporeals but corporeal beings too. 68 ἐν μιᾷ ῥοπῇ σύμπαντα (Psell. omn. 24, 27, 12 Westerink) “everything by a single inclination”. 69 The second part of this chapter only partially corresponds to prop. 172 of Proclus’ Elements. 70 Petritsi, II, ch. 172, 188, 11-16. 71 Here Psellos explains interestingly the ‘kataphatic’ aspect of unparticipated intellect: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἀμέθεκτος, ἀλλ’ἐμφάσεις τινὰς δίδωσι τοῖς μετ’αὐτὸν τῆς ἰδίας ὑπάρξεως (Psell. omn. 25, 28, 6-7 Westerink) “then though it is unparticipated, it transmits certain images of its own being to its consequents”.  
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of its thought, because it cannot change toward the better one, and it does not want to change toward the worse. Thus, it thinks according to its own nature the priors as well as the consequents. Then it does not possess themselves but their causes.72 And it has intellectually those which are intelligible and intellectually those which are sensible.7374 In general, chapter 25 does not reproduce Proclus’ text from his Elements 
of theology as exactly as for example chapter 22 of Psellos’ De omnifaria doctrina corresponds to prop. 167 of Proclus’ Elements.  What about Petritsi? I suppose he would agree with Psellos though he would avoid using words like “does not want” (i.e. the participated intellect “cannot change toward that which is better, and does not want [to change] toward that which is worse”)75: for Petritsi, it is rather an ontological necessity than the wish, not to change toward the lower entities.76 
Chapter 26  Psellos calls “intellectual forms” souls, intellects, angels, archangels, powers and others. As Psellos claims, they are both implicit each in other and severally existent.77 They all interpenetrate all and at the same time each one exists in itself. Unlike them, all bodies exist separately by themselves and they cannot penetrate each other. As for the intellectual forms, they exist in one another and also each apart in its distinctness,78 like theorems which are contained in a single                                                              72 οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὰς αἰτίας ἐκείνων. (Psell. omn. 25, 28, 12-13 Westerink). This corresponds almost exactly to Proclus’ phrase from prop. 172: οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὰς αἰτίας τὰς ἐκείνων. (Procl. ET 172, 152, 2-3 Dodds) “what it contains is not that [which are resultants] but their causes”. Transl. by Dodds, 153, slightly modified. 73 καὶ ὡς τὰ νοητὰ νοερῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ νοερῶς. (Psell. omn. 25, 28, 13-14 Westerink). Psellos repeats almost exactly Proclus’ thesis: ὡς οὖν τὰ νοητὰ νοερῶς ἔχει πᾶς, οὕτω καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ νοερῶς. (Procl. ET 173, 152, 6-7 Dodds) “as it contains the intelligible world intellectually, so also it contains the sensible world in the same mode”, transl. by Dodds, 153. 74 Psell. omn. 25, 28, 2-14 Westerink.  75 πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ κρεῖττον οὐ δύναται, πρὸς δὲ τὸ χεῖρον οὐ βούλεται. (Psell. omn. 25, 28, 10-11 Westerink). 76 Petritsi, II, ch. 31, 82; epilogue, 212. See L. Alexidze, “Ioane Petritsi”, - in: Interpreting Proclus, 232-234. 77 Πάντα τὰ νοερὰ εἴδη, οἷον ψυχαί, νόες, ἄγγελοι, δυνάμεις, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶ καὶ καθ’ἑαυτὸ ἕκαστον. (Psell. omn. 26, 28, 2-3 Westerink). Here Psellos repeats exactly the first thesis of Proclus’ prop. 176, adding to Procus’ text specification of intellectual forms, “such as souls, angels, archangels, powers, and others like that”. Cf. Proclus: Πάντα τὰ νοερὰ εἴδη καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶ καὶ καθ’αὐτὸ ἕκαστον. (Procl. ET 176, 154, 3-4 Dodds) “All the intellectual Forms are both implicit each in other and severally existent.” Transl. by Dodds, 155. 78 ἐν ἀλλήλοις γοῦν εἰσὶ πάντα τὰ νοερὰ εἴδη ἡνωμένως καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστον διακεκριμένος. Psell. omn. 26, 28, 9-10. Psellos repeats almost exactly Proclus’ thesis: πάντα ἄρα τὰ νοερὰ εἴδη καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἡνωμένως καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστον διακεκριμένος. (Procl. ET 176, 154, 26-27) “Thus all the intellectual Forms exist both in one another as a unity and also each apart in its distinctness.” Transl. by Dodds, 155. 
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soul. 7980 Unlike Psellos, Petritsi does not mention in the commentary to prop. 176 of Proclus’ Elements ‘archangels’ or ‘powers’, though ‘angels’, and also ‘daemonic’ (in a (neo)platonic sense of this word) soul are present in other parts of his commentary.81 
Chapter 27 According to Psellos, every intellect is full of divine forms82 such as for example goodness, piety,83 justice, sameness, identity, and others. The more divine intellect embraces more universal forms, while the lower intellect embraces more specific ones.84 The higher intellects “exercise greater powers, whereas the lower, being more advanced in plurality, thereby restrict the powers which they possess.”85 
                                                             79 ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ τὰ θεωρήματα τὰ ἐν μιᾷ ψυχῇ. (Psell. omn. 26, 28, 10-11 Westerink). Psellos makes a short resumé of a longer phrase from Proclus’ Elements: εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ ταῖσδε ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι καὶ παραδειγμάτων δέοιτο, τὰ θεωρήματα νοείτω τὰ ἐν μιᾷ ψυχῇ. (Procl. ET 176, 154, 27-29 Dodds) “If in addition to the above proofs anyone should feel the need of examples, let him consider the theorems which are contained in a single soul”. Transl. by Dodds, 155. 80 Psell. omn. 26, 28, 2-11 Westerink. 81 For ‘angels’ see Petritsi, II, ch. 29, 78, 29; ch. 75, 136, 13; epilogue, 216, 10. For ‘daimons’ see Petritsi, I, ch. 129 (this is a proposition from the Elements which exists only in the Georgian version), 79, 10-26, and Petritsi’s commentary on this problematic proposition in Petritsi, II, ch. 129, 165, 5-31. See also L. Alexidze, “Dianoia in Ioane Petritsi’s Commentary”, - in: Chôra, p.187-191.  82 Πᾶς νοῦς πλήρης ἐστὶ τῶν θείων εἰδῶν. (Psell. omn. 27, 2 Westerink). Psellos makes a paraphrase of Proclus’ thesis: Πᾶς νοῦς πλήρωμα ὢν εἰδῶν. (Procl. ET 177, 156, 1 Dodds).  83 To my mind “piety” (ὁσιότητος) is quite a non-Proclean word in this context but it has more Christian connotation. I think, Petritsi, unlike Psellos would not use it in this context. Moreover, in Proclus’ text (prop. 177) there is no concrete list of Forms at all. Nor it is in Petritsi’s commentary on this proposition. 84 ἀλλ’ὁ μὲν θειότερος νοῦς ὁλικωτέρων ἐστὶ περιεκτικὸς εἰδῶν, ὁ δὲ ταπεινότερος μερικωτέρων. (Psell. omn. 27, 28, 3-5 Westerink). Psellos makes a periphrase of Proclus’ thesis: ὁ μὲν ὁλικωτέρων, ὁ δὲ μερικωτέρων ἐστὶ περιεκτικὸς εἰδῶν. (Procl. ET 177, 1-2 Dodds) “but certain of them [i.e. intellects, - L.A.] embrace more universal and others more specific Forms.” (transl. by Dodds, 157). 85 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀνωτέρω νόες δυνάμεσι χρῶνται μείζοσιν, οἱ δὲ κατωτέρω πληθυνόμενοι μᾶλλον ἐλαττοῦσι τὰς δυνάμεις ἂς ἔχουσι. (Psell. Omn. 27, 28, 5-7 Westerink). I applied Dodds’ translation of Proclus’ Elements to this part of Psellos text. Psellos’ text corresponds to Procl. ET 177, 156, 5-7: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀνωτέρω δυνάμεσι χρῶνται μείζοσιν, ἑνοειδέστεροι τῶν δευτέρων ὄντες· οἱ δὲ κατωτέρω, πληθυνόμενοι μᾶλλον, ἐλαττοῦσι τὰς δυνάμεις ἂς ἔχουσι. “For the higher intellects, being more unitary than the derivative, exercise greater powers, whereas the lower, being more advanced in plurality, thereby restrict the powers which they posses.” Transl. by Dodds, slightly modified, 157. Psellos omitted few words from this text of Proclus: ἑνοειδέστεροι τῶν δευτέρων ὄντες (“being more unitary than the derivative”). 
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Correspondingly, those that are closer to the One, are less multiple but more powerful compared with their consequents. Thus, the more an entity is one, the more power it has, and vice versa.86 Therefore, as Psellos claims, the unity is more powerful, while the division is advanced in plurality.87  In the commentary on prop. 177 Petritsi concentrates on the same issue:  “The lower [intellects] are more in number, though they possess less power, while the higher ones, though less in number, are more powerful”.88 Then Petritsi explains, why it is so and how we should understand it: “because they imitate better the highest supreme transcendence. But when you hear ‘high’ or ‘low’, don’t imagine it in a local sense, i.e. don’t think about incorporeal and non-dimensional [entities] [by means of concepts of] ogkoi [i.e. material substrates] and dimension, but take into consideration rather the capacities of substances, [their] powers, and [their] actuality”.89 Interestingly, neither Psellos nor Petritsi reproduce in their texts the second part of Proclus’ prop. 177 (p. 156, 16-24 Dodds). However, Petritsi, like Proclus, speaks also about the intellects as producers and causes of the effects (the higher intellects produce more effects by means of fewer forms, while the lower ones produce fewer effects by more forms),90 whereas Psellos concentrates only on the fact of embracing forms by intellects.  
Chapter 28 Psellos first discusses the intellectual forms, numbers, and intellects:  
                                                             86 τὰ γὰρ τῷ ἑνὶ συγγενέστερα ἐλαττότερα μέν εἰσι τῷ πλήθει τῶν ὑφ’ἑαυτά, τῇ δυνάμει δὲ ὑπεραίρει· τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς πορρωτέρω ἔμπαλιν. (Psell. omn. 27, 28, 7-9 Westerink). This corresponds to Proclus’ text: τὰ γὰρ τῷ ἑνὶ συγγενέστερα, τῷ ποσῷ συνεσταλμένα, τῇ δυνάμει τὰ μετ’αὐτὰ ὑπεραίρει· καὶ τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς πορρωτέρω ἔμπαλιν. (Procl. ET 177, 156, 7-9 Dodds) “For those principles which are more akin to the One, while their number is relatively contracted, excel their consequents in power; and of those more remote the opposite is true.” Transl. by Dodds, 157. 87 Psell. omn. 27, 28, 8 – 29, 14 Westerink. 88 Petritsi, II, ch. 177, 190, 21-25: “რამეთუ უქუენაესნი სიმრავლითა უკუე უფრო, ხოლო ძალთა 
უკნინეს; ხოლო უზენაესნი რაჲზომობითა სიმრავლისა უმცრო, ხოლო დაზესთაებითა 
ძალაჲთ უფრო”. 89 Petritsi, II, ch. 177, 190, 25-29: “რამეთუ უმეტეს ჰბაძვენ მას ზესა ზესთაობასაცა. ხოლო შენ 
ოდეს ზეობა გესმას ანუ ქუეობა, ნუ ადგილთა წარმოიკერპებ და ჰაზროჲ უსხეულოთათჳს 
და განუზიდველთა ონკოთა და განსაზიდთა, არამედ სიმარჯუენი არსებათა და ძალნი და 
უფრო მოქმედიერობაჲ გაიგონე”. 90 Procl. ET 177, 156, 10-13 Dodds. Cf. Petritsi, II, ch. 177, 190, 19-23. 
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“Every intellectual form is producer of perpetual [beings].91 And every intellectual number is finite.”92  Then Psellos writes on intellects generally, and on participated ones in particular: “every intellect is a whole as that which is a composite of parts: each of them is united with others and distinct from them.93 And every participated intellect is either divine, as linked to gods, or only intellectual.94 And every participated divine intellect is participated by divine souls.95 And every intellect which is participated but remains intellectual, is participated by souls which are neither divine nor are subject to change between intellect and non-intellectuality,96 but by those which are eternally intellectual according to [both their] substance and [their] activity.”97                                                               91 Πᾶν νοερὸν εἶδος ἀιδίων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν. (Psell. omn. 28, 29, 2 Westerink). This is exactly the same as the first phrase of Proclus’ prop. 178. (Dodds’ translation: “Every intellectual Form is constitutive of things perpetual”, Procl. ET 178, 157). 92 καῖ πᾶς νοερὸς ἀριθμὸς πεπέρασται. (Psell. omn. 28, 29, 2-3 Westerink). Psellos repeats almost exactly the first thesis of Proclus’ prop. 179: πᾶς ὁ νοερὸς ἀριθμὸς πεπέρασται. (Procl. ET 179.3 Dodds) “The entire intellectual series is finite.” Transl. by Dodds, 159. 93 καὶ πᾶς νοῦς ὅλος ἐστὶν ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὑποστάς, καὶ ἕκαστος καὶ ἥνωται τοῖς ἀλλοις καὶ διακέκριται ἀπ’αὐτῶν. (Psell. omn. 28, 3-4 Westerink). Here Psellos repeats almost exactly Proclus’ thesis, Procl. ET 179, 158, 11-12 Dodds: πᾶς νοῦς ὅλος ἐστίν, <οὐχ> [οὐχ was inserted by Dodds, also in his translation, 156 - L. A.] ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὑποστάς [καὶ ἕκαστος καὶ ἥνωται τοῖς ἀλλοις καὶ διακέκριται ἀπ’αὐτῶν] [καὶ ἕκαστος … ἀπ’αὐτῶν was eliminated by Dodds in his translation, - L. A.]. As a result, the whole passage was translated by Dodds (p. 159) as follows: “Every intelligence is a whole, though not one composite of parts (prop. 171).” See also notes by Dodds, 293-294. Thus, Psellos’ reading of the first phrase of prop. 179 does not correspond to Dodds’ interpretation of the same thesis.  94 καὶ πᾶς ὁ μετεχόμενος νοῦς ἢ θεῖος ἐστὶ ὡς θεῶν ἐξημμένος ἢ νοερὸς μόνον. (Psell. omn. 28, 29, 4-5 Westerink). Psellos repeats the first phrase of Proclus’ prop. 181: Πᾶς ὁ μετεχόμενος νοῦς ἢ θεῖος ἐστιν, ὡς θεῶν ἐξημμένος, ἢ νοερὸς μόνον. Procl. ET 181, 158, 19-20 Dodds. 95 καὶ πᾶς θεῖος νοῦς μετεχόμενος ὑπὸ ψυχῶν μετέχεται θείων. (Psell. omn. 28, 29, 6 Westerink). This is an exact reproduction of the first thesis of prop. 182 of Proclus’ Elements of theology, 160, 5-6 Dodds. 96 καὶ πᾶς νοῦς μετεχόμενος μέν, νοερῶς δὲ μένων, μετέχεται ὑπὸ ψυχῶν οὔτε θείων οὔτε νοῦ καὶ ἀνοίας ἐν μεταβολῇ γινομένων. (Psell. omn. 28, 29, 6-8 Westerink). Psellos repeats almost exactly the first thesis of Proclus’ prop. 183: Πᾶς νοῦς μετεχόμενος μέν, νοερὸς δὲ μόνον ὤν, μετέχεται ὑπὸ ψυχῶν οὔτε θείων οὔτε νοῦ καὶ ἀνοίας ἐν μεταβολῇ γινομένων. (Procl. ET 183, 160, 13-15 Dodds) “Every intellect which is participated but purely intellectual is participated by souls which are neither divine nor yet subject to the alternation of intellect with unintelligence.” Transl. by Dodds, 161, slightly modified.  97 ἀλλ’ὑπὸ τῶν κατ’οὐσίαν ἀεὶ καὶ κατ’ἐνέργειαν νοερῶν. (Psell. omn. 28, 29, 8-9 Westerink). Psellos repeated almost exactly Proclus’ prop. 183: πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς ὑπὸ τῶν κατ’οὐσίαν ἀεὶ καὶ κατ’ἐνέργειαν νοερῶν μετέχεται. (Procl. ET 183, 160, 18-19 Dodds) “for every intellect is participated by principles perpetually intellectual both in their substance and in their activity.” Transl. by Dodds, 161, slightly modified. 
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In the following part of chapter 28 Psellos discusses the identity of intellect’s thinking and creating:  “and every intellect produces its consequents by thinking, and its creative activity is in thinking, and its thought in act of creation.”98 Here Psellos repeats the first thesis of prop. 174 of Proclus’ Elements of 
theology. The similar idea about intellect’s mode of thinking is expressed by Petritsi as follows: “and what it [i.e. intellect] thought, that it had also created; and what it created, that it thought. Neither the thought is uncreative, nor the product of creation is thoughtless”.99  Further, Psellos claims that every intellect is intellectually that which is superior to it and that which is consequent upon it.100 The very last phrase of chapter 28 of Psellos’ work is a common idea about the differences between intellect’s and soul’s mode of thinking: “and other is thought in the intellect, and another is that of the soul.”101 The differences between soul’s and intellect’s art of thinking, as we already said, are very frequently discussed by Petritsi too. Thus, chapter 28 of Psellos’ work is a compilation of fragments from prop. 173-174, and 178-183 of Proclus’ Elements, as it was indicated by Westerink.102 The main idea of this chapter (identity of creation and intellection in nous) was shared and expressed by Petritsi too. 
Chapter 29 Psellos claims that soul is intellectual, and intellect is also intellectual, though intellect is intellectual by its substance, while soul is intellectual through participation. Intellect has its intellectuality by itself; to be intellect and intellectual is the same, while soul acquires its intellectuality by means of looking at intellect; 
                                                             98 καὶ πᾶς νοῦς τῷ νοεῖν ὑφίστησι τὰ μετ’αὐτόν, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ ποίησις ἐν τῷ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν. (Psell. omn. 28, 29, 9-11 Westerink). Psellos repeats almost exactly the first thesis of Proclus’ prop. 174: Πᾶς νοῦς τῷ νοεῖν ὑφίστησι τὰ μετ’αὐτόν, καὶ ἡ ποίησις ἐν τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ ἡ νόησις ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν. (Procl. ET 174, 152, 8-9 Dodds). 99 ესე არს ესე, რამეთუ, რაჲცა გაიგონა, და ქმნაჲცა; და რაჲცა ქმნა, გაიგონაცა. და არა არს 
გაგონებაჲ უქმ და არცა ნაქმი გაუგონებელ. Petritsi, II, ch. 174, 188, 30 - 189, 1. 100 καὶ πᾶς νοῦς νοερός ἐστι καὶ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ μετ’αὐτόν. (Psell. omn. 28, 29, 11-12 Westerink). Psellos reproduced the first phrase of prop. 173 of Proclus’ Elements, 150, 22-23 Dodds. 101 καὶ ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἐν τῷ νῷ νόησις, ἄλλη δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς. (Psell. omn. 28, 29, 12 Westerink). 102 Psellos, Omn., 29, notes by Westerink to ch. 28. 
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therefore, it has the act of thinking secondarily, while intellect has it primarily.103 Our return to the universal intellect occurs by means of a partial intellect.104 The idea that return to the universal intellect occurs by means of a partial intellect, expressed by Psellos in the last sentence of this chapter, corresponds to Petritsi’s commentary on prop. 166 of Proclus’ Elements: the cosmos and all the stars and spheres are endowed by soul and intellect, “and when cosmos participates in the first intellect, it does it by means of the partial intellect.”105  Moreover, in chapter 175 of the commentary Petritsi claims that a soul which is sometimes intellectual is unable to participate neither in the universal soul nor in a partial intellect without intermediation.106 
Chapter 30 This chapter is mainly about soul, though it concerns intellect too. It is a compilation from Proclus’ propositions. Psellos starts with a general definition of souls considered in their relation to intellect: “Every soul is either divine, or it changes from intellect to unintelligence, or is intermediate between [these two states, i.e.], thinking permanently although being inferior to the divine souls.”107  Interestingly, unlike Proclus and Psellos, Petritsi makes a precision about the last two kinds of souls:  “and it is said that there is a changeable soul, i.e. ours, that which changes from intellect to unintelligence, dismissing intellect. And there is [also] another soul, intermediate between these two ones [i.e. between the divine souls and the changeable ones], which is permanently connected with intellectual [beings], and is unchangeable; such is [the soul] of sun and of other similar [beings]”.108                                                              103 Psell. omn. 29, 29, 1-5 Westerink. 104 Psell. omn. 29, 29, 11-12 Westerink. 105 და კუალად ოდეს პირველსა გონებასა ეზიარებოდის აღმკული, ნაწილებითისა გონებისა 
მიერ ეზიარების. Petritsi, II, ch. 166, 185, 7-9. 106 Petritsi, II, ch. 175, 189, 21-23. 107 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἢ θεία ἐστὶν ἢ μεταβάλλουσα ἀπὸ νοῦ εἰς ἄνοιαν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, ἀεὶ μὲν νοοῦσα, καταδεεστέρα δὲ τῶν θείων ψυχῶν. (Psell. omn. 30, 29, 2-3 Westerink). Psellos repeats exactly the first thesis of Proclus’ prop. 184, 160, 21-23 Dodds. Psellos repeats this thesis also in his treatise “On Soul”, criticizing this opinion. Psell. Phil. Min. 2.11, 22, 4-7 O’Meara. Petritsi’s commentary corresponds to Proclus’ texts. With ‘intermediate souls’ Proclus as well as Petritsi meant probably the demonic souls, as also in prop. 183 and Petritsi’s commentary. 108 და კუალად არსო სული ქცევადი, ესე იგი არს ჩუენი, ოდესმე გონებისადა შეყოფილი და 
ოდესმე უგუნურებისადა, ვითარ გამგდე გონებისაჲ. და ამათ საშუვალ არსო სხუაჲ სული, 
სამარადისოდ გონიერთადა შეყოფილი და უქცევი, ვითარ მზისაჲ და სხუათა ესვითათაჲ. Petritsi, II, ch. 184, 193, 29-33. 
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Psellos also characterizes soul in its relation to the divine nature: “every divine soul is god psychically, while the soul which participates in the intellectual intellect is permanently god’s satellite, and every [soul] which admits change, is sometimes god’s satellite”.109 Further, Psellos characterizes soul from the point of view of its independence from a corporeal entity. As he claims, “every soul is an incorporeal substance and separable from body”.110 Further, Psellos proceeds with characteristics of soul, which, as he says, is “indestructible and imperishable,111 is life and a living being,112 intermediate between indivisibles and those that are divided in association with bodies”.113                                                               109 καὶ πᾶσα μὲν θεία ψυχὴ θεός ἐστι ψυχικῶς, πᾶσα δὲ νοεροῦ μετέχουσα νοῦ θεοῦ ὀπαδὸς ἀεί, πᾶσα δὲ μεταβολῆς δεκτικὴ θεοῦ ὀπαδὸς ποτέ. (Psell. omn. 30, 29, 3-4 Westerink). This is almost the same as the first thesis of Proclus’ prop. 185 The only difference is that Proclus puts ‘souls’ and ‘gods’ in plural, while Psellos in singular: πᾶσαι μὲν θεῖαι ψυχαὶ θεοί ἐστι ψυχικῶς, πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ τοῦ νοεροῦ μετέχουσαι νοῦ θεῶν ὀπαδοὶ ἀεί, πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ μεταβολῆς δεκτικαὶ θεῶν ὀπαδοὶ ποτέ. (Procl. ET 185, 162, 1-3 Dodds). “All divine souls are gods upon psychic level; all those which participate the intellectual intellect are perpetually attendant upon gods; all those which admit of change are at certain times attendant upon gods.” Transl. by Dodds, 163, slightly modified. 110 καὶ πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀσώματός ἐστιν οὐσία καὶ χωριστὴ σώματος. (Psell. omn. 30, 30, 1 Westerink). Here Psellos repeats exactly the very beginning of Proclus’ Elements of theology, prop. 186, 162, 13-14 Dodds. Petritsi in the commentary on prop. 186 concentrates on incorporeal substance of soul and its reversion upon itself. He opposes this thesis to Aristotelian theory and claims that soul “is not inseparable from bodies, unlike entelecheia of Stagirites.” Petritsi, II, ch. 186, 194, 29-31. (Petritsi uses the Greek word entelecheia in Georgian transliteration). On soul’s reversion upon itself, its ability to think its own nature, ascending to intellect and even transcending intellect wrote Psellos in his first small treatise “On Soul”, Psell. Phil. Min. 2.1, 1, 1-16 O’Meara. 111 ἀνώλεθρός τε καὶ ἄφθαρτος. (Psell. omn. 30, 30, 1-2 Westerink). Psellos repeats the first thesis of Proclus’ prop. 187, 162, 24 Dodds. (And Proclus himself also repeats this thesis in the same prop., 162, 31 Dodds). Psellos repeats this characteristic of soul also in his treatise “On Soul”, Psell. Phil. Min. 2.11, 22, 12-13 O’Meara. As for Petritsi, in the commentary on prop. 187 he discusses soul’s incorporeal substance. Petritsi claims that soul is free from corporeal affects, and unlike Aristotelian entelecheias, does not require a substrate (i.e. a body). Petritsi, II, ch. 187, 195, 4-16. 112 καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ζῶν. (Psell. omn. 30, 30, 7 Westerink). Psellos repeats here the first thesis of Proclus’ prop. 188, Procl. ET 188, 164, 1 Dodds. This thesis is repeated also by Proclus himself as a conclusion at the end of the same proposition, 164, 18-19 Dodds, and by Psellos in his treatise “On 
Soul”, Psell. Phil. Min. 2.11, 22, 15. Also Petritsi claims in the commentary on prop. 188 that soul is a principle of life, and by its presence it transforms a thing into a living being. Further, Petritsi distinguishes life from a living being: the latter is brought alive “only through participation in life, and it is neither reversible upon itself, nor does it search its own self and substance, while life is reversible and searcher of its own substance, which is soul”. Petritsi, II, ch. 188, 195, 26-29. 113 μέση τὲ τῶν ἀμερίστων καὶ τῶν περὶ τοῖς σώμασι μεριστῶν. (Psell. omn. 30, 30, 7-8 Westerink). Here Psellos reproduces exactly the first thesis of Proclus’ prop. 190: Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μέση τῶν ἀμερίστων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τοῖς σώμασι μεριστῶν. Procl. ET 190, 166, 1-2 Dodds (“Every soul is 
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Then Psellos starts a new phrase, again with another characteristic of soul, regarding its substance and activity: “Every participated soul has an eternal substance but a temporal activity.”114  Further, Psellos explains the origin of soul and its relation to intellect: soul “takes its proximate origin from an intellect,115 and possesses all the Forms secondarily which intellect possesses primarily.116 And it is all things, those 
                                                             intermediate between the indivisible principles and those which are divided in association with bodies.” Transl. by Dodds, 167). Psellos repeats this phrase in his treatise “On Soul”, Psellos, Phil., II, ch. 11, 22, 16-17 O’Meara. As for Petritsi, in the commentary on prop. 190 he explains in detail that soul’s substance is intermediate between the domain of intellect, which is indivisible, because intellect’s substance and activity are identical, and it is the first image of the One, on the one hand, and corporeal world, on the other, which is absolutely dissoluble and changeable. Soul is an intermediate between these two opposites: in regard to its substance, it participates in those beings which are absolutely indivisible, because its life is eternally immortal, while its activity is divided. Petritsi, II, ch. 190, 196, 15-32. 114 καὶ πᾶσα ψυχὴ μεθεκτὴ τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν αἰώνιον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν κατὰ χρόνον. (Psell. omn. 30, 30, 8-9 Westerink). Psellos repeats here exactly the first thesis of Proclus’ prop. 191 (Procl. ET 191, 166, 26-27 Dodds). Psellos repeats this thesis also in his treatise “On Soul”, but applies it to all kinds of souls, not only the participated ones. Psell. Phil. Min. 2.11, 22, 17 O’Meara. Also Petritsi frequently discusses in his commentary Proclus’ thesis that substance of a participated soul is eternal, while its activity is temporal. Cf. Petritsi, II, ch. 190, 196, 29 – 197, 1; ch. 191, 197, 14-15; ch. 192, 197, 21-33. 115 καὶ προσεχῶς ἀπὸ νοῦ ὑφέστηκε. (Psell. omn. 30, 30, 9-10 Westerink). Psellos reproduces exactly the first sentence of Proclus’ prop. 193 (Procl. ET. 193, 168, 20 Dodds). In the commentary on prop. 193 Petritsi claims that soul proceeds from an unmoved and eternal cause, i.e. from intellect. And everything which proceeds from unmoved causes, is immortal. Reverting upon itself, it reverts first upon its own substance. “Therefore, a soul which is reverted upon itself, makes by its presence beings intellectual.” Petritsi II, ch. 193, 198, 4-10. Thus, soul’s reversion upon its own substance is reversion upon its cause: the intellect. That’s why a soul which is reverted upon itself, according to Petritsi, makes a being, provided with such a soul, intellectual. 116 καὶ πάντα ἔχει δευτέρως τὰ εἴδη· ὁ νοῦς πρώτως ἔχει. (Psell. omn., prop. 30, 30, 10 Westerink). Psellos reproduces here almost exactly (just in a little bit shorter form) the first sentence of Proclus’ prop. 194: Πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάντα ἔχει τὰ εἴδη, ὁ νοῦς πρώτως ἔχει. (Procl. ET. 194, 168, 30 Dodds) “Every soul possesses all the Forms which intellect possesses primitively”. Transl. by Dodds, 169, slightly modified. In the commentary on prop. 194 Petritsi calls intellect ‘father of soul’. He explains that intellect possesses the Forms of beings, and gives them to soul, like a natural father does the same for his natural descendants. Intellect possesses Forms purely and in a superior manner, while soul contains them in a psychological and inferior manner. Further Petritsi explains that not all souls possess Forms in a same manner: there is a difference between, for example, Sun and Kronos etc., according to the differences between their substances. Petritsi, II, ch. 194, 198, 13-21. 
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which are sensible paradigmatically, while those which are intelligible after the manner of an image.117 It is a vital substance and substantial life.118” Thus chapter 30 of Psellos De omnifaria doctrina is a result of a compilation of first sentences from prop. 184-188, 190, 191, 193-195, and 197. Interestingly, Psellos omitted prop. 189, where Proclus discusses the self-animated and self-constituted character of soul,119 and also prop. 196, where Proclus speaks about the perpetual character of the first body which has no temporal origin and is imperishable.120    
2. Psellos’ Philosophica minora II: fragments on intellect, based on 
Proclus’ Elements of Theology, and compared with Petritsi’s 
commentary on Proclus 
 Now we shall discuss some fragments from Psellos’ treatises, collected in the second volume of Philosophica minora, focusing our attention on his understanding of intellect. In many cases, Psellos’ statements are a result of compilation from                                                              117 καὶ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα, παραδειγματικῶς μὲν τὰ αἰσθητά, εἰκονικῶς δὲ τὰ νοητά. (Psell. omn. 30, 30, 11-12 Westerink). Psellos reproduces the first sentence of Proclus’ prop. 195 (Procl. ET. 195, 170, 4-5 Dodds). This phrase is repeated by Psellos in his treatise “On Soul”, Psell. Phil. Min. 2.ch. 11, 22, 19-20 O’Meara. As for Petritsi, in the commentary on prop. 195 he again discusses the intermediate character of soul’s substance which is between intellectual and sensible beings. Petritsi mentions “the good craftsman and producer”, who created soul as a mediator between absolutely indivisible and absolutely divisible beings connecting them with each other. Petritsi, II, ch. 195, 189, 29-32. 118 οὐσία τέ ἐστι ζωτικὴ καὶ ζωὴ οὐσιώδης. (Psell. omn. 30, 30, 12 Westerink). Here Psellos reproduces in a shorter form the first sentence of Proclus’ prop. 197: Πᾶσα ψυχὴ οὐσία ἐστὶ ζωτικὴ καὶ γνωστική, καὶ ζωὴ οὐσιώδης καὶ γνωστική. Procl. ET. 197, 172, 1-2 Dodds (“Every soul is a vital and cognitive substance, a substantial and cognitive principle of life”. Transl. by Dodds, 173). Obviously, in this chapter Psellos did not want to concentrate on a cognitive aspect of soul and omitted its definition γνωστική. As for Petritsi, he finishes the commentary on prop. 197 with a statement that “an intellectual soul is a knower of its self” (მეცნიერ თჳსისა აობისა გონიერი 
სული). Petritsi, II, ch. 197, 200, 12-13. 119 Procl. ET 189, 164, 20-32 Dodds. In the commentary on this proposition, Petritsi like Proclus claims that soul animates living beings not by choice or decision, but it endows with life those bodies which are fitted for it. Moreover, Petritsi explains that their fitness (i.e. the ability to be endowed either with a vital power or a reasonable human soul) is caused by the stars. Petritsi, II, ch. 189, 196, 2-10. 120 Procl. ET 196, 170, 18-30 Dodds. In the commentary on prop. 196 Petritsi distinguishes two kinds of soul: (1) the soul which is absolutely unparticipated and independent from bodies; it is the mostly divine soul and is mostly close to the true Being; (2) the soul primarily participated by those bodies which are perpetual and imperishable, i.e. cosmic ones. Further Petritsi says that soul’s substance is eternal and, being unchangeable and imperishable, it makes by its co-existence and presence the whole celestial structure also perpetual. Petritsi, II, ch. 196, 199, 15-25. 
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various ancient Greek texts. Here we aim to discuss mainly those fragments which are based on Proclus’ Elements. Thus, we shall only briefly mention treatises 2, 9, 12, 21, and not analyze 33-36 at all, which have as a background several philosophical sources, including Plotinus; they are particularly interesting for Psellos’ theory of intellect, and deserve a special study. 
Op. 2 In the 2nd treatise Psellos characterizes intellect as “soul’s most sublime state”,121 and claims that “intellect and soul are not [absolutely] different. Soul has rational and irrational potencies”,122 and intellect is a measure of the rational and cognitive potencies.123  
Op. 9 Treatise 9 is based on Proclus’ interpretation of Chaldean oracles. Here we find an interesting parallel with Petritsi’s text. Like Petritsi, Psellos uses ‘eye’ as a metaphor for knowledge.124 Again, like Petritsi, Psellos claims that intellect is indivisible and has an eternal substance and activity, unlike soul which has indivisible nature but its activity is moved in time.125 Further, Psellos speaks about soul’s reversion upon itself, its act of self-cognition, its concentration on intellect, then elevation toward the One, transcending the level of intellection.126 Further Psellos says that certain intelligible objects must be thought by “intellect’s 
                                                             121 Νοῦς ἐστιν ἕξις ψυχῆς ἡ τελειοτάτη. (Psell. Phil. Min. 2.2, 2, 3 O’Meara). 122 oὐχ ἕτερον δέ τι νοῦς ἐστιν, ἕτερον δὲ ψυχή. τῆς γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐχούσης δυνάμεις τὰς μὲν λογικὰς τὰς δὲ ἀλόγους. (Psell. Phil. Min. 2.2, 2, 4-6 O’Meara). 123 ὁ τοίνυν νοῦς μέρος τῶν λογικῶν καὶ γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων. (Psell. Phil. Min. 2.2, 2,11-12 O’ Meara). 124 τὸ γὰρ ὄμμα γνώσεως σύμβολον. (Psell. Phil. Min. 2.9, 18, 6 O’ Meara). However, otherwise in Psell. Phil. Min. 2.21, 95-96, see below. On ‘eye’ in Petritsi see See L. Alexidze, Ioane Petrizi und die antike 
Philosophie, (Tbilisi, 2008) (in Georgian, title and summary in German), 96-97, with references to Psellos’ commentaries on the Chaldean Oracles, and L. Alexide, “The Chaldean Oracles in Ioane Petritsi’s Commentary on Proclus’ Elements of Theology”, - in: Mélanges Jean-Pierre Mahé, édités par A. Mardirossian, A. Ouzounian, C. Zuckerman. (Association des Amis du Centre d’Histoire et Civilisation de Byzance, Paris, 2014), 14-15. 125 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.9, 19, 15-18 O’ Meara. This issue is very frequently discussed by Petritsi too. Petritsi, II, prologue, 8, 31 – 9, 8; ch.78, 13, 5-12 etc. 126 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.9, 19, 26-28 O’ Meara. For soul’s elevation toward the One and its self-concentration see Petritsi, II, ch. 8, 33; ch. 13, 45; ch. 14, 48; ch. 15, 49; ch. 186, 194. See L. Alexidze, “’One in the Beings’ and ‘One within Us’: The Basis of the Union with the One in Ioane Petritsi’s Interpretation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology”, - in: Georgian Christian Thought and Its Cultural 
Context. Memorial Volume for the 125th Anniversary of Shalva Nutsubidze. Edited by T. Nutsubidze, C. B. Horn, B. Lourié. (Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2014), 175-193.  
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flower”.127 Petritsi too uses this expression.128 Then Psellos mentions a very important concept for Neoplatonism generally and for Petritsi in particular: “the one in us”.129 
Op. 10 Treatise 10 is specially dedicated to intellect and is based on Proclus’ 
Elements of theology.130 Naturally, we find here the same ideas which were discussed by Psellos in De omnifaria doctrina, chapters 21-30, and they too correspond to Petritsi’s interpretation. Psellos says that he exposes “Greek theories”,131 and at the end of the chapter he makes a precision that his exposition is based on Proclus’ Elements of theology,132 but does not assert that he shares these ideas. As in chapter 21 of De omnifaria doctrina, here too Psellos claims that intellect can be (according to Greek theories) either unparticipated or participated. The unparticipated intellect is the head of all plurality of intellects, while some of the participated intellects irradiate the hypercosmic and unparticipated soul, and others – the intra-cosmic soul.133 The first intellect knows only itself, and each consequent one knows itself and its priors.134 Intellect, knowing itself in activity, is not distinguished from the object of knowledge.135 The unparticipated intellect knows everything plainly, while each consequent intellect knows each object according to one special character, and every intellect has its substance, potency and activity established in eternity.136 Intellect is an indivisible substance,                                                              127 νόου ἄνθει. Psell. Phil. Min. 2.9, 20, 3 O’ Meara. 128 On ‘flower’ in Petritsi see L. Alexidze, “The Chaldean Oracles in Ioane Petritsi’s Commentary”, 11-13. 129 τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἕν. (Psell. Phil. Min. 2.9, 20, 3-4 O’ Meara). On this concept in Petritsi’s commentary see L. Alexidze, “’One in the Beings’ and ‘One within Us’”, 175-193.  130 All references to Proclus’ Elements are indicated by D. O’Meara, Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21. 131 κατὰ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς δόξας. (Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 3 O’Meara). 132 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 31-32 O’Meara. 133 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 4-6 O’Meara. (Cf. Psell. omn. 21, 26, 2-13 Westerink). Corresponds to Procl. ET 166, 144, 9-14 Dodds. Cf. Petritsi, ch. 166, 185, 1-10. 134 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 6-7 O’Meara. (Cf. Psell. omn. 22, 26, 2-3 Westerink). Corresponds to Procl. ET 167, 144, 22-24 Dodds. In the commentary on prop. 167 Petritsi analyzes three kinds of knowledge: knowledge of self, of its subsequents, and of its priors. In the first case intellect’s activity is identical with its substance, in the second case activity is weaker than the substance, and the last case represents the best kind of knowledge, because intellect thinks its causes and therefore thinks its own self better than when it knows just its own self. Petritsi, II, ch. 167, 185, 16-32. 135 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 7-8 O’Meara. Corresponds to Procl. ET 168, 146, 18-19 Dodds. Cf. Petritsi’s commentary on prop. 168: in intellect the act of cognition and the object of cognition are the same. Petritsi, II, ch. 168, 186, 8-9. 136 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 8-9 O’Meara. Corresponds to Procl. ET 170, 4-7 Dodds but Proclus does not mention ‘potency’ here, though he speaks about eternal character of intellects’ potency in prop. 169, 148, 3 Dodds. In the commentary on prop. 170 Petritsi discusses the differences between intellect’s simultaneous knowledge and soul’s discursive reasoning. Petritsi, II, ch. 170, 187, 4-9 Dodds. 
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without magnitude, incorporeal and unmoved.137 It is identical with its consequents as their cause, and by participation with its priors. It has an intellectual substance by its own being, and it defines everything both what it is as cause and what it is by participation.138 Intellect is directly constitutive of those beings which are perpetual and invariable.139 It produces its consequents by the act of intellection, and its creative activity is thinking, and its thinking is creation.140 Intellect is primarily participated by those which are intellectual both according to their substance and their activity.141 Then Psellos writes about intellectual Forms: all the intellectual Forms are both in each other and separately exitent.142 Each intellect 
                                                             137 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 11 O’Meara. (Cf. Psell. omn. 24, 27, 2-4 Westerink). Corresponds to Procl. ET 171, 1-3. In the commentary on prop. 171 Petritsi explains that each being which is able to revert completely upon itself, is incorporeal. Though the sky is able to revert, imitating soul and intellect, but it cannot do it completely, including all its parts. Then Petritsi compares intellect with sun: in intellect substance and activity are inseparable, like sun and its rays are. Petritsi, II, ch. 171, 187, 32 – 188, 7. 138 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 11-14 O’Meara. (Cf. Psell. omn. 25, 28, 13-14 Westerink). Corresponds almost exactly to Procl. ET 173, 150, 23 – 26 Dodds. Petritsi in his rather short commentary on prop. 173 distinguishes three kinds of intellect: that which is by participation in regard to its priors and principles; that which is equal to its own substance and its own self; that which is a cause in regard to its consequents and effects. Petritsi, II, ch. 173, 188, 21-25. 139 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 14-15 O’Meara. (Cf. Psell. omn. 24, 27, 10 Westerink). Psellos repeats a fragment from Procl. ET 172, 150, 15-16. In the commentary on prop. 172 Petritsi claims that intellect is invariable and eternal according to its substance and also activity, and that what it produces, is perpetual. Petritsi, II, ch. 172, 188, 11-16. 140 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 15-16 O’Meara. (Cf. Psell. omn. 28, 29, 9-11 Westerink). Corresponds to Procl. ET 174, 152, 8-9 Dodds. In the commentary on prop. 174 Petritsi explains that intellect is identical with the objects of intellection, and the act of intellection is creation. Intellect creates beings, and it is father and creator of everything that has a form. Thus, intellect’s power reaches those beings which have a form but it cannot reach those entities which are formless, either superiors or inferiors in regard to the intellect. Petritsi, II, ch. 174, 188, 30 – 189, 8. 141 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 16-17 O’Meara. Corresponds to Procl. ET 175, 152, 19-20 Dodds. In the commentary on prop. 175 Petritsi draws a scale of participation descending from intellect: first is the universal soul, which exercises its activity in time, but is perpetually attached to the intellectual forms, and enjoys their contemplation, though in a psychical and temporal mode that lasts perpetually. Further, the celestial soul contemplates the true Being by mediation of a partial intellect and the universal soul. As for those souls which are sometimes intellectual, they cannot participate neither in the universal soul nor in a partial intellect without mediation. Petritsi, II, ch. 175, 189, 14-23. 142 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 17-18 O’Meara. (The same thesis in a little bit different form was exposed by Psell. omn. 26, 28, 2-3 Westerink, see above). Corresponds to Procl. ET 176, 154, 3-4 Dodds. In the commentary on prop. 175 Petritsi compares the unity of Forms in the intellectual ‘womb’ (საშოჲ) with the unity of seeds in the womb until their separation by the “creative reason” (სიტყჳსა მიერ შემოქმედებითისა. This also can be translated as “creative word”; Georgian 
სიტყვა corresponds to Greek λόγος). Petritsi, II, ch. 176, 189, 31 – 190, 3. 
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is a fullness of Forms, some of them embrace more universal ones, while others more partial ones.143  Every intellectual Form produces that which is perpetual.144 And every intellect is a whole as that which is a composite of parts.145 Every participated intellect is either divine as being linked to gods, or only intellectual.146 The divine intellect is participated by divine souls.147 The participated intellect is not participated either by the divine souls or by those which change from intellect to unintelligence148 but by those which are eternally intellectual according to their substance and activity.149  
                                                             143 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 18-19 O’Meara. (The same thesis but in detail is discussed by Psellos in 
Omn., ch. 27, 28, 2-5 Westerink, see above). Corresponds to Procl. ET 177, 156, 1-2 Dodds. In the commentary on prop. 177 Petritsi explains that some intellects are more universal and superior, others more partial and inferior. The first ones spread their power further than the latter ones, embracing more forms and substances; numerically they are less but their power is greater. Petritsi, II, ch. 177, 190, 17-25. 144 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 19-20 O’Meara. (The same is in Psell. omn. 28, 29, 2 Westerink, see above). Corresponds to Procl. ET 178, 156, 25 Dodds. In the commentary on prop. 178 Petritsi says that every intellectual Form produces those which are perpetual, such as souls and substances of immortal bodies, like that of Apollo, Hermes and others. Petritsi, II, ch. 178, 190, 33 – 191, 2. 145 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 20-21 O’Meara. (cf. Psell. omn. 28, 29, 3 Westerink). Corresponds to Procl. ET 180, 158, 11 Dodds, though Psellos’ manner of reading Proclus’ text here as well as in ch. 28 of 
Omn. is different from that of Dodds, see our note above, to ch. 28 of Psellos’ Omn. Petritsi in the commentary on prop. 180 distinguishes three kinds of wholeness: 1. Before parts, as the wholeness in henads and gods; 2. wholeness composed of parts, like the wholeness of the true Being; 3. wholeness in parts. Petritsi, II, ch. 180, 191, 19-27. 146 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 21-22 O’Meara. (Cf. Psell. omn. 28, 29, 4-5 Westerink). Corresponds to Procl. ET 181, 158, 19-20 Dodds. Commenting on prop. 181 Petritsi claims that the first and unparticipated intellect is the true Being, which is intelligible intellect, then follow intermediate intellects, and so on up to the intellectual intellect. Petritsi, II, ch. 181, 192, 8-20. 147 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 22 O’Meara. (Cf. Psell. omn. 28, 29, 6 Westerink). Corresponds to Procl. ET 182, 160, 5-6 Dodds but with a small difference, because in Proclus we have as follows: “every participated divine intellect is participated by divine souls.” (Transl. by Dodds, 161, slightly modified). In the commentary on prop. 182 Petritsi claims that the first soul is similar to the divine intellect, because soul participates in henads by means of intellect. Petritsi, II, ch. 182, 193, 2-6.  148 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 23-24 O’Meara. Corresponds to Procl. ET 183, 160, 13-15 Dodds with a small difference: “Every intellect which is participated but is purely intellectual”, Procl. ET 183, 160, 13 Dodds (transl. by Dodds, 161, slightly modified). Psellos reproduced the same text in Omn., ch. 28, 29, 6-8 Westerink, in a little bit different form. 149 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 24-25 O’Meara. Corresponds to Procl. ET 183, 160, 18-19 Dodds, and Psell. omn. 28, 8-9 Westerink. In the commentary on prop. 183 Petritsi distinguishes three kinds of intellect: the divine ones, attached to intellects and henads, then souls which change so that sometimes they have cognitive ability and sometimes not, and the third kind is intermediate between these two ones; the souls of this kind are whether variable nor divine, and they do not participate in intellects but in those entities which are intellectual. Petritsi, II, ch. 183, 193, 12-19.  
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Further, Psellos goes back to prop. 179 of Proclus’ Elements. He says that every intellectual number is finite.150 Then Psellos repeats the phrase that every intellect is a whole as that which is a composite of parts,151 and continues quoting from prop. 180: “each of them [i.e. intellect] is united with others and distinct from them.152 But the unparticipated intellect is plainly a whole, as having all its parts in itself as a whole, while each of the partial intellects contains the whole as parts, and is thus everything partially. For each thing is everything according to one [aspect], and according to one [aspect] means nothing other than partially.”153 Psellos finishes his small treatise ‘On Intellect’ saying that this was Proclus’ philosophical theory on intellect, exposed in his Elements of theology.154 
Op. 12 The first part of this treatise is interesting for us for two reasons: it concerns intellect, and it is based on Nemesios Emesa’s Peri physeos anthropou, the text translated by Petritsi into Georgian before he translated Proclus’ Elements. At the very beginning, Psellos says that according to Plotinus’ teaching, intellect and soul are not the same, and this was the opinion of Apolinarios too, while others thought that the intellect is the leading part of the soul.155 
Op. 21 This is one of the most interesting parts of Psellos’ text. Psellos claims that intellect is not an eye of the soul, though many philosophers thought so.156                                                              150 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 25 O’Meara. Corresponds to Procl. ET 179, 158, 3 Dodds, and Psell. omn. 28, 29, 2-3 Westerink. In the commentary on prop. 179 Petritsi explains why the number of intellectuals is not infinite: because that which is closer to the One is more similar to one/unity. Petritsi, II, ch. 179, 191, 8-13. 151 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 25-26 O’Meara. Psellos said the same before, see above, Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 20-21 O’Meara. Corresponds to Procl. ET 180, 12, and Psell. omn. 28, 29, 3 Westerink. 152 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 26-27 O’Meara. Corresponds to Procl. ET 180, 12. Psellos quoted this also in Omn., ch. 28, 3-4 Westerink (Psellos’ reading of Proclus’ text is different from Dodds’ interpretation, see our notes to Psellos’ Omn., ch. 28 Westerink). 153 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 27-30 O’Meara. Corresponds to Procl. ET 180, 13-15. 154 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.10, 21, 31-32 O’Meara. 155 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.12, 23, 17-18 O’Meara. Corresponds to Nemesius, De Natura Hominis. Edidit M. Morani. (Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, Leipzig, 1987), 1, and Petritsi’s translation: Nemesios, On the 
Nature of Man, geo, 3. 156 For Psellos’ sources see notes by O’Meara in Psell. Phil. Min. 2. 95. Psellos by himself claimed in op. 9 that ‘eye’ is a metaphor for knowledge (τὸ γὰρ ὄμμα γνώσεως σύμβολον. Psell. Phil. Min. 2.9, 18, 6 O’ Meara), see above, and our notes to Psell. Phil. Min. 2.9. 
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Why? Because an eye is an organ moved by another thing and directed toward senses, while intellect is soul’s guide and its elevator toward more divine illuminations, filling it with the divine light from above and making it full with immaterial forms.157 As we already mentioned in notes to op. 9, Petritsi uses the expression “eyes of the soul” too,158 meaning the highest aspect of the soul.   
Conclusion 
 In both Psellos’ and Petritsi’s philosophies, Proclus’ theory of intellect with all its aspects (unparticipated intellect, participated one, modes of cognition, the relation of intellect to being, Forms, soul, the One etc) was an important theme. Psellos discussed it in Omnifaria doctrina, ch. 21-30, and Philosophica 
minora II, op. 2, 9, 10, 12, 21, while Petritsi did it in the commentaries on Proclus’ Elements of theology, including his prologue and epilogue. Psellos’ texts on intellect are mainly compilations or paraphrases from Proclus’ Elements of 
theology and, in case of Phil. II, op. 2, 9, 12, 21, 33-36 from other texts of Proclus as well as various ancient Greek philosophical and patristic sources, expanded in some cases with Psellos’ own short additions or comments. Petritsi’s commentaries are also based on Proclus’ Elements, though he took into consideration Proclus’ other texts as well as various (neo)platonic sources, explicitly mentioned in his work, too. Petritsi’s commentary on intellect has much in common with Psellos’ texts, though the accents made by these two philosophers interpreting the same propositions from Proclus’ Elements are frequently quite different. Certainly Petritsi was aware of Psellos’ works though there is no evidence that in his commentary he used them. The similarity between Psellos’ and Petritsi’s interpretations can be explained by the fact that both of them had as a background the same philosophical sources (first and foremost, Proclus’ Elements). Proclus’ philosophy, and the Platonic tradition generally, seems to be completely acceptable for Petritsi, and nowhere in his commentary did he criticize them. 
 
                                                              157 Psell. Phil. Min. 2.21, 95, 7-16 O’Meara. Cf. Plotinus: “In the intelligible world seeing is not through another [medium], but through itself, because it is not [directed] outside.” Plot. V 3 [49], 8, 21-22, transl. by A. H. Armstrong. Cf. Plot. III 8 8 [30], 11, 1-2; IV 5 [29], 1; VI 7 [38], 41, 4-5; VI, 8 [39], 7; On seeing with and without eye in Plotinus see L. Alexidze, “Eros as Soul’s ‘Eye’ in Plotinus: What does it see and not see?”, - in: Platonism and its Legacy. Selected papers from the Fifteenth Annual 
Conference of the International Conference of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies. Edited by J. Finamore, T. Nejeschleba. (The Prometheus Trust, Gloucestershire, UK, 2019), 41-58. 158 Petritsi, II, ch. 40, 94, 7-8. See also Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica, p.196. 
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